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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MANNES - VALE, INC. and/or 
STATE INSURANCE FUNDf 
Defendants/Appellantsf 
-v-
ROBERT K. VALE and/or the 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Applicant/Respondents. 
Case No. 20917 
STATEMENT QF ISSUE PRESENTED QN APPEAL 
The issue in this case is whether it was proper for the 
Industrial Commission to implement the rulings of two Utah 
Supreme Court cases which determined that there is no statute of 
limitations on workers' claims for medical expenses by awarding 
medical benefits to Mr. Robert K. Vale. 
PROVISION WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-78 (Supp. 1985) 
The powers and jurisdiction of the 
commission over each case shall be 
continuing, and it may from time to time make 
such modification or change with respect to 
former findings, or orders with respect 
thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, 
provided, however, that records pertaining to 
cases, other than those of total permanent 
disability or where a claim has been filed as 
in 35-1-99, which have been closed and 
inactive for a period of 10 years, may be 
destroyed at the discretion of the 
commission. 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission 
shall include interest at the rate of 8% per 
annum from the date when each benefit payment 
would have otherwise become due and payable. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
App l i can t , Robert K. Vale f su f fe red i n j u r i e s t o h i s 
eye f ear and shoulder from an i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t t h a t occur red 
on June 3 , 1968, (R. 3 f 3 1 , 33) Mr. Vale r ece ived medical 
b e n e f i t s and t e m p o r a r y - t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y through August 2 3 , 1971. 
(R. 33) Add i t iona l medical b e n e f i t s were claimed by Mr. Vale in 
1974, and a payment of $675.00 was made by Defendant Fund on 
September 17 , 1975. (R. 5) Other medical expense c la ims of Mr. 
Vale were refused by the Fund. (R. 33) 
A hea r ing was he ld on November 29 , 1976, in which Mr. 
Vale sought an award of a d d i t i o n a l compensation and b e n e f i t s . 
(R. 9 , 33-37) On December 9 , 1976, t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge 
i s s u e d an order denying compensation and medical b e n e f i t s 
i n c u r r e d on t h e ground t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s had run . 
(R. 33-37, Appendix 1) 
Mr. Vale f i l e d a Motion for Review on December 27 , 
1976, and the Defendant Fund f i l e d a Memorandum i n Response on 
Apri l 2 1 , 1977. (R. 39-46 , 48-56) The I n d u s t r i a l Commission 
affirmed the Decis ion of the Admin i s t r a t i on Law Judge on May 17, 
1977. (R. 58 , Appendix 2) 
Mr. Vale communicated with the Fund beginning in 1983 
and continuing through early January, 1985 in an effort to secure 
payment for medical benefits under the doctrine of a 1982 Utah 
Supreme Court case to the specific affect that there is no 
statute of limitations for medical expenses. (R. 62-82) This 
effort to secure medical payments was rejected by the Fund. 
(R.82) 
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On March 6 , 1985, Mr. Vale f i l e d a p e t i t i o n t o reopen 
h i s case (R. 85) on a p r i n t e d form e n t i t l e d "APPLICATION FOR 
HEARING," the reby seeking medical b e n e f i t s through order of the 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission. The Insurance Fund responded through two 
l e t t e r s . (R. 88 , 90-91) The I n d u s t r i a l Commission i s sued i t s 
order on J u l y 1 2 , 1985, g r a n t i n g to Mr. Vale medical b e n e f i t s . 
(R. 93-96, Appendix 3 ) . 
On August 19 , 1985 Defendant Insurance Fund f i l e d a 
Motion for Review. On September 4 , 1985 the Commission i s sued 
i t s Denial of Motion for Review and aff i rmed t h e award of medical 
payments t o Mr. Vale for the per iod fo l lowing the Commission's 
den ia l of t h e Fund 's Motion for Review of May 17 , 1977. (R. 106-
109, Appendix 4 ) . 
Defendant S t a t e Insurance Fund then p e t i t i o n e d t h i s 
Court for review, seeking r e v e r s a l of the I n d u s t r i a l Commission's 
award of those medical payments t o Mr. Vale. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The I n d u s t r i a l Commission ru l ed c o r r e c t l y in awarding 
medical b e n e f i t s t o a p p l i c a n t Robert K. Vale because t h e 
Commission was implementing the d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Court t h a t 
t h e r e i s no s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s for medical expenses , or 
because the Commission was p roper ly e x e r c i s i n g i t s cont inu ing 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , or bo th . 
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ARGUMENT 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER GRANTING TO 
MR. VALE PAYMENT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED 
AFTER MAY 1 7 , 1977 SHOULD BE UPHELD SINCE THE 
ORDER WAS ISSUED UNDER RULINGS OF THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT AND PURSUANT TO LAW AND EQUITY. 
The I n d u s t r i a l C o m m i s s i o n ' s 1985 award of m e d i c a l 
e x p e n s e s t o Mr. Va le f o r t h e p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g i t s e a r l i e r , 1 9 7 7 , 
o r d e r was c o r r e c t b e c a u s e f o l l o w i n g t h a t 1977 o r d e r t h e Utah 
Supreme C o u r t d e c l a r e d t h a t once an i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t was 
e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r e i s no s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s on a c l a i m f o r 
such e x p e n s e s . I n C h r i s t e n s e n v . I n d u s t r i a l Commiss ion . U t a h , 
642 P .2d 7 5 5 , 757 (1982) t h e Cour t con f i rmed t h a t 
n
'compensation, f as used in the f inal sentence of sect ion 35 -1 -
99f does not include payments for medical expenses." Hence, in 
the language of Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Indus t r ia l Commission, 
Utah, 597 P.2d 875, 877 (1979), which the Court in Christensen 
quoted, once i t i s determined tha t there was an indus t r i a l 
accident "there i s no l im i t a t i on as to the time during which the 
medicals must continue to be furnished." 
Here, there was never any question about the existence 
of an indus t r i a l accident . (R. 3 , 3 1 , 33, Defendants Brief a t 
l ) 1 Thus, there i s no s t a t u t e of l imi t a t ions bar to Mr. Vale ' s 
claims for medical expenses. 
1
 The Insurance Fund had even made a payment of medical expenses 
on September 17, 1975 (R. 33), l e s s than a year before Mr. Vale 
f i l e d h i s claim. (R. 3 ) . In addi t ion to supporting the fact 
tha t an i n d u s t r i a l accident had occurred, the payment e s t ab l i shes 
t h a t , even i f U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-99 (1985 Supp.) were 
considered to be a s t a t u t e of l imi t a t i on for medical claims, 
contrary to Kennecott Copper and Christensen, the requirement of 
§ 35-1-99 tha t the claim be f i l ed "within three years from . . . 
the date of the l a s t payment of compensation" was s a t i s f i e d . 
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The Insurance Fund a s s e r t s , nevertheless f t ha t the 1977 
decision of the Commission based on the 1976 rul ing of the 
Administrative Law Judge i s JLSLS judicata in t h i s act ion and bars 
Mr. Vale fs recover despi te Kennecott Copper and Christensen. I t 
argues t h a t the Commission never acquired j u r i s d i c t i o n and hence 
could not have continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n under U.C.A. 1953, § 35-1-
78 (1985 Supp.) to award Mr. Vale h is post-1977 medical expenses. 
The Commission .did have j u r i s d i c t i o n . The claim tha t 
the s t a t u t e of l im i t a t i ons has run i s an affirmative defense. 
Kimball v. McCormick, 70 U. 189, 259 P. 313 (1927). I t i s 
pleaded spec i f i ca l ly to the effect tha t an act ion i s barred by 
the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . Rule 9(h) , Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. I t was not t rea ted as a j u r i sd i c t i ona l matter in 
e i ther the Kennecott Copper or the Christensen case. I t simply 
i s not a predica te for a rul ing on the question of subject matter 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
The term "without j u r i s d i c t i o n " i s sometimes properly 
used in a general sense as the equivalent of "without 
d i s c r e t i o n . " 2 I t was so used by the Administrative Law Judge in 
h is December 9, 1976 Order. (R. 36) His phrase was, "the 
Commission i s without j u r i s d i c t i o n to do other than dismiss the 
app l i ca t ion . " Xd. At the same time, he rendered a decision on 
the mer i t s , saying the appl icat ion "should be denied" and 
2
 " ' I t [ Jur i sd ic t ion] i s a term in general use, . . . having 
d i f ferent meanings, dependent on the connection in which i t i s 
found and the subject matter to which i t i s d i r ec t ed 1 , and i t i s 
in fact 'often used without any determinate s i g n i f i c a t i o n . ' " 
General Trades School v. United S t a t e s , 212 F.2d 656 (8th Cir . 
1954), quoting 50 C.J .S. a t 1089-90. 
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ordering " tha t the Claimant 's appl ica t ion for compensation be, 
and i s herebyf denied." I d . The Commission affirmed the order, 
in i t s terms f "wherein the a p p l i c a n t ' s claim for compensation was 
denied." Xd. a t 58. 
Having taken j u r i s d i c t i o n and rendered a decision on 
the meri ts on the basis of an affirmative defense, the Commission 
has continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n under U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-78 (1985 
Supp.). Through t h i s continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n i t can give effect 
to the rul ings and p o l i c i e s enunciated by t h i s Court. I t has 
done so in t h i s case. Moreover, by implementing the Kennecott 
Copper and Christensen rulings through i t s 1985 award of medical 
benef i t s to Mr. Vale, the Commission not only complied with the 
law of t h i s Court, but a t the same time advanced the policy of 
the worker 's compensation law. That policy i s , of course, tha t 
the law be l i b e r a l l y applied in favor of coverage of the employee 
in order to a l l e v i a t e the hardships tha t r e s u l t from indus t r i a l 
acc idents . Baker v> Indus t r ia l Commission/ 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 
p.2d 613 (1965); M & K Corp. v. Indus t r i a l Commission, 112 Utah 
488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948); Park Utah Consol. Mines Co. v. 
Indus t r i a l Commissionr 84 Utah 481; 36 p.2d 979 (1934). Ss& 
ALSJQ, Marshall v> Indus t r i a l Commissionr Utah 704 p.2d 581 
(1985) . 
The Insurance Fund c i t e s United Sta tes Smelting, 
Refining and Mining CQt v, Nielsonr 19 Utah 2d 239, 430 p.2d 162 
(1967), as a bar to the continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Commission 
in t h i s case. In Nielson the Court construed U.C.A., 1953, § 35-
1-78 "to mean the Commission has continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n only 
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during the period of the l im i t a t i ons s t a t u t e s " involved. 19 Utah 
2d a t 242, 430 P.2d a t 164. But in the ins tan t case involving 
medical expensesf there i s no s t a t u t e of l imi t a t i on because of 
the ru l ings in Kennecott Copper and Christensen- NielSQnr 
therefore , does not cut off Mr. Vale 's r igh t to recover medical 
expenses. 
A separate element which prevents the 1977 decision of 
the Commission from being a x££ judicata bar to Mr. Vale 's claim 
i s t h a t the 1977 decision was not f inal in the sense necessary to 
give i t res jud ica ta e f fec t . (The Fund acknowledges at page 4 of 
i t s brief tha t JL££ judicata can not take effect unless the 
judgment in question i s "final.1 1) Since the Commission had 
exercised j u r i s d i c t i o n in the case, and therefore has continuing 
j u r i s d i c t i o n under U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-78 (1985 Supp.), further 
procedings "were possible which might a l t e r or upset the 
judgment,n (Brief of State Insurance Fund a t 4) and therefore 
there was no f ina l judgment upon which x££ judicata could be 
based. 
Res judicata should not apply at a l l in t h i s case. But 
even if i t did f i t would not bar recovery for the post-1977 
medical expenses of the claimant. The issue decided by the 
Commission in 1977 was whether or not the s t a tu t e of l imi t a t ions 
of U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-99 (Supp. 1985) barred claims for medical 
expenses to the time of the 1977 hearing. The Commission said in 
i t s 1977 ruling (though erroneously i t i s now clear in the wake 
of the cases) tha t those claims were barred by the s t a t u t e . The 
claims which the Commission honored under Kennecott Copper and 
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Chri fifrftpfipn in i t s Orders of July 12, 1985 (R. 93-96) , and 
September 4 , 1985 (R. 106-10)
 f had not previously been ruled on* 
As to them there previously had been no judgment, and therefore 
they are not barred by the doctrine of res j ud i ca t a . 
Defendant Fund r e l i ed in i t s brief on the Restatement 
of Judgments, Under the Restatement i t s e l f / however, even if the 
1977 ruling of the Indus t r i a l Commission were found to be a 
rul ing on the question of subject matter j u r i s d i c t i o n , tha t 
question can be r e l i t i g a t e d where, as here, "[a]11owing the 
judgment to stand would subs t an t i a l l y infr inge the author i ty of 
another t r i b u n a l . " Restatement Second. Judgments, § 12(2) . The 
Court 's ru l ings in Kennecott Copper and Christensen would be 
rendered meaningless if they could be avoided by incarcera t ion of 
the Commission's decision in a l i n g u i s t i c prison cal led "no 
jur isd ic t ion ." &£& a lga, Restatement Secondr Judgments, § 16 
(allowing for s e t t i n g aside of a judgment, such as the 1977 
order , which was based on an e a r l i e r judgment, such as rul ings 
pr ior to Kennecott Copper and Christensen, and which was 
n u l l i f i e d by a l a t e r judgment, such as Kennecott Copper and 
Chris tensen) . 
Also, under Restatement Second, Judgementsr § 83(2)(d), 
ru les of X£5 judica ta do not apply to an adminis t ra t ive decision 
if the decision i s not f i n a l . And under Kennecott Copper and 
Christensen, no ru l ing of the Commission on a hona. LL&SL 
indus t r ia l -acc iden t -c la im for medical expenses can be considered 
f ina l for purposes of the running of the s t a t u t e of l imi t a t ions 
because those case's have held there i s no such s t a t u t e of 
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l i m i t a t i o n s * J u d i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s extend t o a l l t imes pas t and 
supercede p r i o r "erroneous or i n c o n s i s t e n t d e c i s i o n s . " .£££, 
e . g . , Frank v . Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915) . 
CONCLUSION 
Law and po l i cy suppor t a p p l i c a t i o n of the C o u r t ' s 
r u l i n g s i n Kennecott Copper and Chr i s t ensen a t l e a s t t o t h e p o s t -
1977 medical c la ims of Robert K. Va le . The Commission's 1985 
r u l i n g was not bar red by lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n or t h e d o c t r i n e of 
££S j u d i c a t a . That r u l i n g in favor of Mr. Vale should be 
af f i rmed. 
Dated t h i s t^ w day of February, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
t i <r * 
RALPH L. FINLAYSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to James R. Black and Laurie A. Haynie, Black & Moore, 
261 East Broadway, Suite 30 0, 'Salt Laka City, Utah 84111, 
Attorneys for Appellants, on the </ u day of February, 1986. 
Q l ^ . k-V^W 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
inr. j.iNLUjDitf.i.fvjL, uunraiaaiuiN ur UIAA 
File No. 1M2314-1 
* 
ROBERT K. VALE, * 
* 
Claimant, * REPORT AND ORDER 
vs. * OF 
MANNESS-VALE, INC. and * DISMISSAL 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, * 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room, Industrial Commission of Utah, 350 East 500 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, November 29, at 10:30 o'clock a.m. 
Said hearing was pursuant to order and notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: Claimant was present and represented by counsel, Dean L. Gray. 
Defendants were represented by counsel, Robert D. Moore. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The Claimant in this matter was injured during the course of his 
employment on June 3, 1968 when a vehicle he was driving was struck broadside 
by a truck causing injuries to his eye, ear, and shoulder. The subsequent 
partial paralysis of the right eye resulted in near blindness in that eye. 
The Claimant underwent treatment and received compensation from the State Insur-
ance Fund up to and including August 23, 1971 in the amount of $5,681.43 in 
medical payments and $1,168.40 in temporary total disability compensation. The 
Claimant visited his eye doctor several times but was examined February 8, 1974 
to get a final determination on his eye condition. Vale did not receive a 
report from his doctor until September or October 1974. In the meantime, he was 
also examined by an ear specialist. During all of this time from August 23, 
1971 to 1974 no claim had been made with the Commission or the State Insurance 
Fund. Finally bills were submitted to the State Insurance Fund in late 1974 
and, after some exchanges of phone calls and correspondence, at least one bill 
was paid in September 1975. Other medical bill submitted in November 1974 
were rejected on the theory that the three year statute of limitations had run 
as of August 23, 1974. 
The Claimant contends that the three year statute of limitations did 
not apply because the Fund had previously made payments which brought it within 
the eight year statute of limitations referred to in the law as Section 35-1-66, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and further because the Insurance Fund had made a pay-
ment on September 17, 1975 of $675.00. The Claimant further contends that he 
is entitled to an award of at least one hundred weeks of compensation for blind-
ness in his right eye under the theory that the prior compensation paid for 
his eye damage had been improprerly computed and should now be corrected pursuant 
REPORT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
PAGE TWO 
to statute 35-1-66 (4) (b). 
The Defendant maintains that Section 35-1-99 applies which requires 
the filing of a claim with the Industrial Commission within three years from 
the date of the accident or the date of last compensation and further maintains 
that this section is juridictional which leaves the Commission without any 
discretion in the matter. The Defendant also contends that the payment by the 
Fund subsequent to the running of the three year statute did not toll the run-
ning of the statute nor does the fact that an inadequate payment for eye damage 
may have been made : toll the running of the statute so that a more ade-
quate payment could be made later. The Defendant further contends that the 
eight year statute of limitation in jfection 35-1-66 does not apply. 
THE LAW: 
Section 35-1-99 reads in part, as follows: 
"If no Claim for compensation is filed with the 
industrial commission within three years from the date of 
the accident or the date of the last payment of compensa-
tion, the right to compensation shall be wholly barred." 
Section 35-1-66 reads in part, as follows: 
"The Commission may make a permanent partial disa-
bility award at any time prior to eight years after the date 
of injury to any employee whose physical condition resulting 
from such injury is not finally healed and fixed eight years 
after the date of injury and who files an application for 
such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight year 
period. 
Section 35-1-66 (4) (b) provides for 100 weeks of compensation for 
total blindness of one eye. 
DISCUSSION: 
The language of Section 35-1-99 is very specific; a claim must be 
filed with the Industrial Commission within three years after the accident or 
after the last payment of compensation and if not it "shall" (mandatory lan-
guage) be "wholly" (not partially) barred. 
In the case of Glen H. Jones v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 28 
(1965), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Industrial Commission 
denying an application where the Claimant was last attended by a doctor three 
years before his present claim was filed but the claim was not paid by the 
employer until after the three years had passed. 
REPORT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
PAGE THREE 
The Claimant contended that since the employer paid the doctor bill even if it 
was paid after the three year period, the statute was tolled and was not a bar 
to recovery. The Court held that the statute was not tolled and the mere fact 
that the employer paid the medical bills after the three years cannot "emasculate 
the obvious legislative intent of the statute". 
In the case of the United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Company, 
v. Nielsen, 20 Utah 2d 271 (1968), the Industrial Commission held that the Com-
mission had continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Section 35-1-78 if a Claim had 
been timely filed in accordance with section 35-1-99. Holding in effect there 
was no limitation of time within which to file a supplemental claim. The 
Supreme Court disagreed with the Commission and said that such interpretation 
to hold an employer or his insurer vulnerable to the further liability indefin-
itely was not the intent of the legislature. The court held that the Claimant 
was precluded from an award of any supplemental compensation, namely, medical 
expenses." The Court reversed the Industrial Commission on the grounds that 
the six year (now eight year) statute of limitations applicable to the Claim-
ant's award for partial disability had run. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Fredericks v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 19 Utah 2d 233, (1967) the Claimant was injured on July 9, 1959 and the 
carrier paid last compensation on January 26, 1960. The file contained the 
insurance carrierfs statement of benefits paid filed October 8, 1959. Mrs. 
Frederickson had filed nothing more with the Commission until November 12, 1965 
at which time she filed an Application for Additional Compensation and Medical 
Benefits. It was the Courtfs unanimous decision that the three year statute of 
limitations had run. 
In the case of Don W. Peterson v. Young Electric Sign Company, 29 Utah 
2d 446, (1973) the Claimant was injured in February 1964. The insurance carrier 
filed a report of the injury and made payment of total disability and medical 
expenses in August 1966. The Claimant then, from time to time, saw various doc-
tors but did not file an application with the Commission until September 1971. 
In June 1972 a Claims Examiner for the insurance company wrote the Commission 
stating that the carrier was accepting liability and would pay medical and com-
pensation benefits. However, in July of the same year counsel for the Defendants 
filed a formal answer with the Commission denying liability on the basis that the 
three year statute of limitations had run. The Commission denied the application 
for compensation and the Supreme Court affirmed the Order. The Court in the 
Peterson case considered the Claimant's allegation that the ruling in the Apex 
Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah case, 116 Utah 305 (1949) applied 
but distinguished the case because in the Apex case the employer filed a report 
with the Commission and the insurance carrier requested the injured employer 
employee to appear before the Commission's Medical Panel and both both parties 
assumed that the Industrial Commission had acquired jurisdiction and both had 
participated in hearings and subsequent proceedings and the Commission made 
findings which were accepted by the parties. Such was not the case in the Peter-
son case nor in our case. 
In the case of W. W. Gardner v. Industrial Commission, 30 Utah 2d 377 
(1973) the Claimant, Camden, was injured July 1968. The Claimant saw a doctor 
twice in August of 1968 and the last payment from the insurance company was 
made October 25, 1968. He saw a doctor in July of 1971 and a second doctor in 
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January 1972, however, no notice of these appointments was given to either the 
Industrial Commission or the insurance company. On March 31, 1972 Camden filed 
an application for hearing with the Commission some three years and seven months 
after the accident and some three years and four months after the last compensa-
tion was paid. The Defendant claimed that the statute starts to run from the 
date of the last treatment, calling on the language in the Jones case, but the 
Court said there is no basis for such a contention. 
The principal cases dealing with an eight year statute of limitations 
are the cases of United States Steel Corporation v. The Industrial Commission of 
Utah and William Zele, Sr., 27 U.2d 145, 493 P.2d 986 (Utah 1972); Utah Apex Co. 
et al. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, et al., 116 U. 305, 209 P.2d 578 (Utah, 
1949); and Hardy v. Industrial Commission of Utah, et al., 89 Utah 561, 58 P.2d 
15 (Utah, 1936). Those cases are not applicable in this case. There has been 
no previous adjudication by the Commission in this case, the Claimant has not 
written any letters to the Commission which are sufficient to constitute the 
filing of a claim as required in Section 35-1-995 Utah Code Annotated, and the 
carrier in this case had not requested the intervention of the Commission on 
anything. 
The cases clearly show that the three year statute does apply in this 
case and that the application of the statute of limitations requiring a filing 
within three years is jurisdictional and not discretionary with the Commission. 
If the Claimant failed to file an application within three years after the date 
of injury or the payment of last compensation, no matter how equitable the claim 
may be, the Commission is without jurisdiction to do other than dismiss the 
application. The fact that the Insurance Fund paid something to the Claimant 
after the statute had run or had negotiated with the Claimant for a considerable 
period of time after the statute had run cannot be interpreted as lulling of 
the Claimant into failing to file because he thought payment would be made. 
The Claimant was not prejudiced by the payment nor the negotions because the 
time has already expired and a filing at any period of time after the running of 
the statute would have been ineffective whether it was a few days late, several 
months late, or several years late. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The application by the Claimant, Robert K. Vale, for additional bene-
fits for medical expenses, for permanent partial disability compensation for 
temporary total disability compensation should be denied. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Claimant's application for compensa-
tion be, and is hereby, denied. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission Keith E. Sohm 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, December 9, Administrative Law Judge 
1976. 
ATTEST: 
I si Gloria B. Hanni 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on December 9 , 1976 a copy of the 
attached Report and Order of Dismissal was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage prepaid: 
Robert K. Vale, 
14828 North Skokie Ct., Phoenix, Arizona 85022 
Dean L. Gray, 
Attorney at Law 
1610 Walker Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Manness-Vale, Incorporated 
3162 South 200 West, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
State Insurance Fund 
350 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert D. Moore, 
Attorney at Law 
Ten West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
File No. 1M2314-1 
ROBERT K. VALE, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
MANNESS-VALE, INC. and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR 
REVIEW 
On or about December 9, 1976 a Report and Order of 
Dismissal was entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the 
Commission wherein the applicant's Claim for Compensation was 
denied. 
On or about December 27, 1976 the Commission received 
a Motion for Review of Report and Order of Dismissal from the 
applicant by and through his attorney. 
On or about April 21, 1977 the Commission received 
a Memorandum in Response to Claimant's Motion for Review from 
the defendants by and through their attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire 
Commission for review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code 
Annotated. The Commission has reviewed the file in the above 
entitled case and we are of the opinion that the Motion for 
Review should be denied and the Order of Dismissal of the 
Administrative Law Judge confirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge, dated December 9, 1976 shall be, and is hereby 
affirmed and the Motion for Review shall be, and is hereby, denied, 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this 
17th day of May 1977. 
ATTEST: 
/ / 
r. / / J J? 
1 -!. i-il /} 
Carlyle F. Gronning. Chairman 
u..-. 
A 
Stephen M. Hadley, Commissioner 
/%/ Gloria B. Harm! 
Gloria B. Hanni, Secretary John R. Schone, Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I cert i fy that on MaY '^ , 19]J_ a copy of the 
attached D e n i a l o t Motion t o r Review
 Was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage prepaid: 
Mr. Robert K. Va le 
14828 North Skokie Ct . 
P h o e n i x , Ar izona 85022 
A t t o r n e y Dean L. Gray 
1610 Walker Bank B u i l d i n g 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
Manness -Vale , I n c . 
3162 South 200 West 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84115 
S t a t e Insurance Fund 
350 E a s t 500 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
A t t o r n e y Robert D. Moore 
S u i t e 400 , Ten West Broadway 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
M a r g e 
By 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000225 
ROBERT K. VALE, * 
Applicant, * ORDER 
* 
vs. * 
* 
MANNESS-VALE, INC., and * 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, * 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On or about December 9, 1976, a Report and Order of Dismissal was 
entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission. The 
Administrative Law Judge found that under Section 35-1-99, Utah Code 
Annotated, the Applicant's claim for additional benefits was barred in that it 
was not filed within three years from the date of the accident or the last 
payment of compensation. On December 27, 1976, a Motion for Review was filed 
by the Applicants attorney, followed by a response to the Motion for Review 
filed by the Defendants on April 21, 1977. 
.* On May 17, 1977, the Commission denied "the notion for Review and 
upheld the Administrative Law Judge's denial of benefits. 
On March A, 1985, a second Application for Hearing was filed by the 
Applicant asking for additional medical benefits. An Answer to the 
Application was filed on March 19, 1985, by the Defendant, Utah State 
Insurance Fund, alleging basically that because the issue of ongoing medical 
benefits was held to be barred as well as compensation benefits by the 1976 
Order, the issue was res judicata and therefore not subject to Commission 
review. 
After substantial correspondence, the matter was referred to the 
Commission for opinion. 
Since the Administrative Law Judge's Order of December 9, 1976, the 
Supreme Court on numerous occasions has interpreted the meaning of Section 
35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated. Two cases are directly on point. In Kennecott 
Copper Corporation v. the Industrial Commission of Utah and Bill Bilanzich. 
597 P.2d 875 Utah (1979), the Court addressed the question of whether the 
category of '•compensation" encompassed medical benefits in addition to 
temporary total disability and permanent partial disability compensation. The 
Court held that medical benefits were separate from "compensation" and were 
not to be barred under the statute of limitations referenced in Section 
35-1-99. The Court relied on the language contained in Sections 35-1-45 and 
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35_1_81 to interpret the legislative intent to distinguish between medical 
benefits and compensation* The Court concluded: 
The reasons for making this distinction between compensation 
to be paid for loss of wages because of injury and dis-
ability, as contrasted to the payment for medical expenses in 
connection therewith, is that the law is firmly established 
that, once it is determined that there was an industrial 
accident, there is no limitation as to the time during which 
the medicals must continue to be furnished. 
The Bilanzich case was affirmed subsequently in Mel Christensen and 
State Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission of Utah and Scott Morrison, 
17426 Utah (1982). That case, decided after the May 12, 1981, amendments, 
ruled: 
A well-established canon of statutory construction provides 
that where a legislature amends a portion of a statute but 
leaves other portions unamended, or re-enacts them without 
change, the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied 
with prior judicial constructions of the unchanged portions 
of the statute and to have adopted them as consistent with 
its own intent. State v. Roberts, 56 Utah 136, 190 P. 351 
(1920); Ouaremba v. Allan, 67 M.J. 1, 334 A.2d 321 (1975); 
Ladd v. Board of Trustees, 23 Cal.App.3d 984, 100 Cal.Rptr 
571 (1972); People v. Mills, 40 111.2d 4, 237 N.E.2d 697 
(1968). Two years after our Bilanzich decision, the 
Legislature amended Section 35-1-99 without altering the 
sentence this Court construed in Bilanzich. Ch. 287, 1981 
Utah Laws 1361. Consequently, we conclude that Bilanzich 
correctly interpreted the intent of the Legislature in 
holding that •compensation,* as used in the final sentence of 
Section 35-1-99, does not include payments for medical 
expenses. We reaffirm that decision. 
When the Supreme Court has so adamantly clarified the legislative 
intent of Section 35-1-99, the Commission is compelled to enforce the Court*s 
directives. 
The Commission therefore finds that the Administrative Law Judge's 
Order of December 9, 1976, is not res judicata in respect to the continuing 
obligation of the State Insurance Fund to pay medical benefits. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the State Insurance Fund be allowed 
thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to investigate the claim, after 
which a response should be filed with the Commission indicating whether 
Mr. Vale's medical benefits will be paid or denied. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the KiM\ day of July, 1985, a copy of the 
attached Order was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, 
postage paid: 
Dennis V* Lloyd, Attorney at Law 
Utah State Insurance Fund 
P.O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-1420 
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
Robert K. Vale 
2544 West Campbell, #37 
Phoenix, AZ 85017 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000225 
* 
ROBERT K. VALE, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* 
vs* * 
* 
MANNESS-VALE, INC. and/or * 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On July 12, 1985, the Commission issued an Order requiring the 
Defendant, State Insurance Fund, to pay further medical expenses to the 
Applicant, for expenses incurred after the Applicant was denied benefits 
finally in a May 17, 1977, Commission decision. On August 19, 1985, the 
Defendant, State Insurance Fund filed a Motion for Review with the Commission, 
stating that the Applicant should be denied any further benefits as the 
unappealed Commission Order of 1977, denying all benefits, was res judicata on 
the issue of the State Insurance Fund liability for any benefits. The 
Commission Is of the opinion that the Motion for Review must be denied. A 
review of the file follows. 
Ths Applicant was injured in a traffic accident on June 3, 1968, 
while in the course of his employment. The State Insurance Fund paid 
temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses for the Applicant 
through August 23, 1971. The Applicant continued to see physicians for both 
his eye and ear injury and submitted several bills to the State Insurance Fund 
after August 23, 1974. Although the State Insurance Fund did pay one of the 
bills in September 1975, other bills were rejected because the State Insurance 
Fund felt that the Applicant was barred further recovery due to the notice 
requirements of U. C. A., Section 35-1-99. 
On May 28, 1976, the Applicant filed his claim for compensation 
claiming medical expenses and permanent partial impairment benefits. On 
November 29, 1976, a Commission hearing was held and on December 9, 1976, the 
Administrative Law Judge issued his Order dismissing the Applicant's claim. 
The dismissal was based on the Applicant's failure to comply with the 
requirements of U. C. A., Section 35-1-99, which requires that a claim be 
filed with the Commission within three years of the last payment of 
compensation. At the time, the Administrative Law Judge issued his Order, the 
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language of U. C. A. , Section 35-1-99, provided that failue to file a claim 
within the three year period wholly barred the right to compensation. The 
Applicant filed a Motion for Review which was denied on May 17, 1977. No 
appeal was filed with the Supreme Court. 
On March 6, 1985, the Applicant filed an Application for Hearing with 
the Industrial Commission claiming benefits for additional medical expenses 
incurred as the result of the 1968 accident. The Defendant, State Insurance 
Fund, answered the Application by stating that the issue of liability for the 
State Insurance Fund had been decided in the May 17, 1977, Order and that, in 
the alternative, there was insufficient evidence to show a causal connection 
between the 1968 accident and the additional medical expenses incurred. On 
July 12, 1985, the Comission issued an Order finding the State Insurance Fund 
liable for the additional medical expenses. The Commission Order stated that 
the Supreme Court has clarified the intent of U. C. A., Section 35-1-99, in 
several opinions issued since the May 17, 1977, Order which the Defendant 
claims to be res judicata. The Order states that the Supreme Court has 
determined that reference to ••compensation" in U. C. A., Section 35-1-99, does 
not include medical expenses, and thus, U. C. A., Section 35-1-99, provides 
for a statute of limitations for an award of compensation and not one for 
medical expenses. 
The Motion for Review filed by the Defendant, State Insurance Fund, 
on August 19, 1985, states that regardless whether the Administrative Law 
Judge or the Commission incorrectly interpreted the law at the time of the 
1977 Order, the Order was not appealed to the Supreme Court, and thus, that 
Order is final and res judicata on the issue of liability for the State 
Insurance Fund for further medical expenses. We agree in part with the 
Defendant. The exact issues before the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Commission at the time of the 1977 Order are not now reviewable. No appeal 
was made at the correct time and the Commission cannot now overrule the 
decision made at that time despite subsequent Supreme Court clarificaton of 
the law. However, the issues before the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Commission in 1977, were first, an award of permanent partial impairment 
benfits, and second, medical expenses incurred prior to 1977. Therefore, the 
Applicant is barred from an award of benefits based on either of those two 
claims. The March 1, 1985, Application for Hearing, and the July 12, 1985, 
Order deal, with medical expenses incurred after the 1977 Order, and this 
issue has not yet been decided by the Commission. Res judicata does not bar 
the decision made by the Commission in the July 12, 1985, Order. Therefore, 
we deny the Defendants Motion for Review, and affirm the July 12th, Order as 
the new issue before the Commission must be resolved based on Supreme Court 
interpretation of the intent of the legislature regarding U. C. A., Section 
35-1-99. The State Insurance Fund is liable for the Applicants medical 
expenses caused by the June 3, 1968, accident incurred after May 17, 1977. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Commission dated July 
12, 1985, is affirmed and the Defendant's Motion for Review is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the matter be remanded to the 
Administrative Law Judge to detennine the amount owed the Applicant at the 
present time for medical expenses incurred subsequent to the May 17, 1977, 
Order. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
^ ^ of September, 1985. 
Commissiqp^Secretary 
Commissioner 
108 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I certify that on September ^_f> , 1985, a copy of the 
attached Denial s& Motion for Review in the case of Robert K. Vale, issued 
September V^ ^ 1985, was mailed to the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
Robert K. Vale, 2544 West Campbell, #37, Phoenix, AZ 85017 
Dennis V. Lloyd, Atty., State Insurance Fund, 560 South 300 
East, SLC, UT 84111 
Erie Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
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By ^ ^ Lin 
Wilma 
